These two SNSF programs of which certain
projects are made available online here were carried out by a small
group of researchers at the Law Faculty of the University of Geneva
between 2001 and 2006. They are all situated in the trade and
environment context, specifically in the domain of the interactions
between WTO agreements and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)
and focus on the role of science in the determination of the WTO
compatibility of trade-related environment measures which an
importing country may institute in order to limit or ban certain
imports.
Phase one especially benefited from
cooperation with the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN).
Both programs emphasized the importance of the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety and of the Codex Alimentarius for the regulation of
genetically modified products. The Biosafety Protocol does not
really differ from the WTO in its scientific approach to risk
assessment except that in both the assessment and the management of
risk it contains provisions regarding the application of the
precautionary principle. At the same time it leaves open or subject
to further negotiations several issues such as liability and
redress, labelling, compliance, socio-economic considerations, or
the acceptance of risk.
As far as the Codex Alimentarius is
concerned, the group limited itself to environment-related food
safety, specifically GM food. The Codex is closely related in spirit
to the SPS Agreement thanks to its heavy reliance on scientific risk
assessment with relatively detailed and highly procedural
provisions. On the other hand some of the unresolved issues are the
same in the Codex and the Biosafety Protocol, especially the
politically thorny question of the labelling of GM food which is
considered to be misleading and unnecessary by the US especially,
but necessary by most other countries, especially in Europe where
adequate information on all products, particularly food products, is
considered an unalienable consumers’ right. The Codex traditionally
emphasizes truthfulness and commercially relevant information in its
labelling whereas the Protocol has gone a step further by
introducing a temporary solution which stipulates that shipments
containing raw GM food or feed crops for processing must be labeled
as “may contain” living modified organisms. The Codex has not found
a solution yet on the two very divisive issues of GM labeling and of
precautionary trade restrictions.
Phase one of this research concludes that
the international community needs to arrive at a reconciliation of
principles, rules, standards and procedures which have been
negotiated under disparate legal frameworks with often divergent
objectives. The presently established relationship between on one
hand the complexities of risk assessment and risk management
regarding threats to biodiversity and certain aspects of food
safety, and on the other hand the relative simplicity of import
restrictions allowed under WTO agreements based on traditional
science-based risk assessment procedures is becoming more and more
difficult to maintain. It does not take into consideration the
nature of recent scientific discoveries and processes. We can see a
wide consensus over the need to work toward the twin notions of
mutual supportiveness and legal agreements that pay deference to
each other in their respective domain of authority such as
biodiversity and trade in the cases of the Biosafety Protocol and
the WTO. Our research shows that this objective is not only legally
coherent but also politically legitimate and realistic.
The second phase of this research
emphasizes the related question of the role of scientific standards
on environmental and public health issues in the context of trade
restrictions. The global regulation of trade in genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) through multilateral negotiations and organizations
is at the center of both research programs, but the second phase has
further emphasized the study of the relationship between WTO Law and
science, and it covers new ground with regard to the communication
of risk, an issue area that has been very much neglected in the
literature. Risk communication is specifically considered as a
distinct element of the risk analysis process (defined by the Codex
Alimentarius as consisting of risk assessment, risk management and
risk communication).
The need to communicate scientific
knowledge to decision-makers is not only linked to the need to make
sure that the decision-making process is based on sound scientific
evidence, but also to a basic requirement of democracy. The
regulation of risks is part of the basic functions and mission of a
democratic system of rules and governance. Consequently, scientific
experts cannot decide alone on important science-related policy
issues. Besides, scientific controversies should also be brought to
the attention of the public. We can easily find at the heart of this
reflection the persistence of scientific uncertainty in hazardous
situations where the extent of risk may range from a hardly
conceivable potential to a statistically verified percentage. In
addition, industrial risk assessment techniques are often, if not
always, somewhat biased in favor of avoiding false positives, i.e.
they tend to downplay findings which would increase costs on
technological developments. The public might therefore have a
different “risk assessment” and “risk management”. The scarcity of
research into risk communication in comparison with the quite
abundant literature on risk assessment and risk management raises
the question as to what may have caused this unbalance in the amount
of attention given to the three pillars of risk analysis. Based on
negative experiences which underestimated the importance of building
up the public’s trust, the traditional top down and closed
decision-making process inherent science policy is increasingly
being replaced by better possibilities for the public to participate
early in the decision-making process.
The issue of inadequate information
disclosure in the face of uncertainty is located at the core of the
relationship between law and science and related issues such as
especially environmental governance. Withholding information,
however, can have very serious consequences as shown by the European
Environment Agency (EEA) in the case of the widespread use of
asbestos products over many decades: "Information was not used, or
ignored: or we were all taken by ‘surprise.’" The 1998 Aarhus
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters is an
attempt to sensitize the decision-makers in environmental matters
about the importance of public participation and risk communication.
The achievement or improvement of coherence
among international regulatory frameworks in different sectors has
always been one of the greatest challenges when implementing public
international law. This is perhaps unsurprising as long as
negotiations are carried out by representatives from Ministries or
other governmental bodies with diverging perceptions on specific
issues without effective consultation among them. Trade,
environment, and public health officials, for example, tend to view
quite differently the long term impact of technological developments
or policies. This is why we have such different approaches to risk
analysis at the Biosafety Protocol, the Codex Alimentarius, and at
the various WTO Committees and Councils. Regional differences in the
fundamental approach to the creation of rules and standards are
highly important as well. With regard to regulating GMOs the US has
for many years used specific product-based methodologies. The
European Union on the other hand emphasizes broader production (or
processes)-related methodologies, a divergence which has resulted in
a regulatory polarization. Yet these differences are not limited to
different legal approaches, they depend on “general issues” which
have much to do with risk communication or political choices.